Saturday, 16 February 2019

Summary_Reader Response Draft #3

In the article "Eight failures that left people of Grenfell Tower at mercy of the inferno", Knapton and Dixon (2017) claimed that residents of Grenfell Tower had been put in jeopardy for decades due to a series of flaws related to “building regulation and safety rules”. For instance, there was a revision of building regulations. After 1986, exterior walls were no longer required to be fire-rated. Additionally, external building materials only had to fulfil ‘Class O’ regulations, which did not mention that the building materials had to be non-combustible. It also did not specify a time frame for risk assessments to be conducted whenever alterations to building materials were carried out. Grenfell Tower was deemed to have used combustible materials in its external cladding and, no “safety checks” were conducted following the alteration of cladding materials in May 2016 (Knapton & Dixon, 2017). Furthermore, spaces between the cladding panels allowed wind to pass through and spread the fire to levels above. The absence of a central sprinkler system left the higher levels vulnerable. Moreover, not all doors installed were fire-rated and, there was only one staircase for the residents to escape. Fire experts claimed that the effectiveness of firebreaks was dubious due to the intensity of the fire. Lastly, the government did not review the regulations after the 2009 Lakanal House fire, which claimed the lives of six people (Knapton & Dixon, 2017).

The massive fire at Grenfell Tower was mainly due to the flaws related to the building and fire safety regulations. The relevant authorities failed to thoroughly and promptly examine those regulations. To prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future, it is imperative that the British authorities take quick corrective actions by improving and updating those regulations.

Firstly, the authority responsible for the updating of the fire safety regulations should re-evaluate the staircase requirement. Every building should have at least two exit staircases instead of one. Fire safety regulations stipulated that tall buildings were only required to have one staircase. Residents of Grenfell Tower had no alternative escape route during the fire since the tower had only one staircase. Smoke in the stairwell of Grenfell Tower hindered the rescue process as smoke was entering the stairwell from many levels (Collier, 2017). As many people tried to escape through the staircase, they obstructed and delayed the firefighters from going up.

Secondly, the relevant authority should also re-evaluate the sprinkler requirement. Older buildings could be made compulsory to retrofit sprinklers at every level, regardless of the building height. Fire safety regulations stipulated that sprinklers only had to be installed in buildings of 30 metres in height. Grenfell Tower had no central sprinkler system which made the upper levels more vulnerable to fire since fire hoses have an extension limit. The Fire Protection Association stated: “A sprinkler system would have “undoubtedly” saved lives at the Grenfell Tower blaze” (Baynes, 2017).

Lastly, the relevant authority should review the building regulations. A time frame for risk assessments to be carried out should be specified. All buildings that had altered its building materials were required to undergo fire risk assessments. However, the regulations did not explicitly stipulate a time frame. Although Knapton and Dixon (2017) claimed that there were no "safety checks" conducted at Grenfell Tower after the renovation, Ward (2018) claimed otherwise. A fire risk assessment that was carried out in June 2016, during the renovation at Grenfell Tower, had identified at least twenty "fire safety failings" (Ward, 2018). However, after four months, the issues were not corrected. If the regulations had specified a rectification time frame, the building management would not have delayed the rectification work.

In conclusion, as the case of the Grenfell Tower demonstrates, it is crucial for the British government to review the building and fire safety regulations. It should also be quick to take corrective actions upon completion of the reviews. If these measures had been implemented earlier, the fire at Grenfell Tower could have been prevented.

References:

Baynes, C. (2017, June 18). Ministers ‘ignored warnings on fire safety’ before Grenfell Tower inferno.
Independent. Retrieved from

Collier, H. (2017, June 25). Grenfell Tower’s smoke-filled stairwell could have proved just as deadly as cladding.
Evening Standard. Retrieved from

Knapton, S., & Dixon, H. (2017, June 16). Eight failures that left people of Grenfell Tower at mercy of the inferno.
The Telegraph. Retrieved from

Ward, V. (2018, August 7). Grenfell Tower: Official fire safety warnings served in 2016, documents reveal.
The Telegraph. Retrieved from
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/07/grenfell-tower-official-fire-safety-warnings-served-2016-documents/

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