In the article "Eight failures that
left people of Grenfell Tower at mercy of the inferno", Knapton and Dixon
(2017) claimed that residents of Grenfell Tower had been put in jeopardy for
decades due to a series of flaws related to “building regulation and safety
rules”. For instance, there was a revision of building regulations. After 1986,
exterior walls were no longer required to be fire-rated. Additionally, external
building materials only had to fulfil ‘Class O’ regulations, which did not
mention that the building materials had to be non-combustible. It also did not
specify a time frame for risk assessments to be conducted whenever alterations
to building materials were carried out. Grenfell Tower was deemed to have used
combustible materials in its external cladding and, no “safety checks” were
conducted following the alteration of cladding materials in May 2016 (Knapton
& Dixon, 2017). Furthermore, spaces between the cladding panels allowed
wind to pass through and spread the fire to levels above. The absence of a
central sprinkler system left the higher levels vulnerable. Moreover, not all
doors installed were fire-rated and, there was only one staircase for the
residents to escape. Fire experts claimed that the effectiveness of firebreaks
was dubious due to the intensity of the fire. Lastly, the government did not
review the regulations after the 2009 Lakanal House fire, which claimed the
lives of six people (Knapton & Dixon, 2017).
The massive fire at Grenfell Tower was
mainly due to the flaws related to the building and fire safety regulations.
The relevant authorities failed to thoroughly and promptly examine those regulations.
To prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future, it is imperative
that the British authorities take quick corrective actions by improving and
updating those regulations.
Firstly, the authority responsible for the
updating of the fire safety regulations should re-evaluate the staircase
requirement. Every building should have at least two exit staircases instead of
one. Fire safety regulations stipulated that tall buildings were only required
to have one staircase. Residents of Grenfell Tower had no alternative escape
route during the fire since the tower had only one staircase. Smoke in the
stairwell of Grenfell Tower hindered the rescue process as smoke was entering
the stairwell from many levels (Collier, 2017). As many people tried to escape
through the staircase, they obstructed and delayed the firefighters from going
up.
Secondly, the relevant authority should
also re-evaluate the sprinkler requirement. Older buildings could be made
compulsory to retrofit sprinklers at every level, regardless of the building
height. Fire safety regulations stipulated that sprinklers only had to be
installed in buildings of 30 metres in height. Grenfell Tower had no central
sprinkler system which made the upper levels more vulnerable to fire since fire
hoses have an extension limit. The Fire Protection Association stated: “A
sprinkler system would have “undoubtedly” saved lives at the Grenfell Tower
blaze” (Baynes, 2017).
Lastly, the relevant authority should
review the building regulations. A time frame for risk assessments to be
carried out should be specified. All buildings that had altered its building
materials were required to undergo fire risk assessments. However, the
regulations did not explicitly stipulate a time frame. Although Knapton and
Dixon (2017) claimed that there were no "safety checks" conducted at
Grenfell Tower after the renovation, Ward (2018) claimed otherwise. A fire risk
assessment that was carried out in June 2016, during the renovation at Grenfell
Tower, had identified at least twenty "fire safety failings" (Ward,
2018). However, after four months, the issues were not corrected. If the
regulations had specified a rectification time frame, the building management
would not have delayed the rectification work.
In conclusion, as the case of the Grenfell
Tower demonstrates, it is crucial for the British government to review the building
and fire safety regulations. It should also be quick to take corrective actions
upon completion of the reviews. If
these measures had been implemented earlier, the fire at Grenfell Tower could
have been prevented.
References:
Baynes, C. (2017, June 18). Ministers
‘ignored warnings on fire safety’ before Grenfell Tower inferno.
Independent.
Retrieved from
Collier, H. (2017, June 25). Grenfell
Tower’s smoke-filled stairwell could have proved just as deadly as cladding.
Evening
Standard. Retrieved from
Knapton, S., & Dixon, H. (2017, June
16). Eight failures that left people of Grenfell Tower at mercy of the inferno.
The
Telegraph. Retrieved from
Ward, V. (2018, August 7). Grenfell Tower:
Official fire safety warnings served in 2016, documents reveal.
The
Telegraph. Retrieved from
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/07/grenfell-tower-official-fire-safety-warnings-served-2016-documents/
